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Controversy: War Culture 
Pierre Purseigle 
Abstract: Cultural approaches to the Great War have played a key part in the renewal of 
First World War Studies. French historians were instrumental to this process, not least with 
the introduction in the 1990s of an important and much debated concept, that of “war 
culture”. In France itself however, the discussion of the “war culture” soon became the 
central if not exclusive focus of the scholarly debate. It soon degenerated into a full-blown 
controversy. The dispute does however raise a number of important questions for our 
understanding of the French and European experience of the conflict.  
1. Introduction 
The ceremony held in Paris on 11 November 2018 under the President of France, Emmanuel 
Macron, offered a fitting and moving conclusion to the official French commemorations of the 
centenary of the First World War. In part designed to meet the political exigencies of that 
particular moment, this inclusive and multicultural ceremony was used by the French leader 
to reassert republican civic values and to defend multilateralism in the face of national-
populist movements and leaders. Most significantly however, the ceremony marked the 
culmination and the symbolic end of a long and intense commemorative sequence. The 
preparations for the French centenary had officially begun in the spring of 2011, when the 
then President, Nicolas Sarkozy, commissioned Joseph Zimet, a senior civil servant and 
historian, to produce a prospective mapping exercise. His report both testified to and foresaw 
what would be a hallmark of the commemoration between 2014 and 2018: a very high 
degree of mobilisation of local authorities, cultural institutions, and of the heritage and 
tourism sectors. Such a degree of investment, if not perhaps unprecedented, had not been 
seen at least since the bicentenary of the French Revolution in 1989. The report set out the 
principles that guided the French government and all stakeholders thenceforward and should 
be seen and studied as a critical piece of evidence in the history of the centenary as public 
policy.  
The report also called for the creation of a scientific board tasked with the definition of the 
intellectual and commemorative orientations of the French centenary. The board was to 
“reflect all historiographical sensitivities (sensibilités)”.i That this most reasonable 
recommendation came couched in a language often associated with ideological and partisan 
debates did not surprise scholars familiar with First World War studies in France. For the 
report thus diplomatically acknowledged the bitter historiographical dispute that had riven the 
field since the late 1990s and split the historical profession over a critical question: how to 
account for the resilience of French soldiers and civilians in the face of the demands of 
industrial warfare in 1914-1918. For over twenty years, this dispute has mainly focussed 
upon the existence, nature, and significance of what Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette 
Becker called the 1914-1918 “war culture.”ii The term now often serves as a convenient if 
misleading shorthand for a critical debate about the respective importance of patriotic 
mobilisation and state-enforced discipline in explaining the cohesion of wartime France. The 
argument was soon framed as an alternative between consent and coercion and as the 
irreconcilable opposition between two distinct groups of historians now at intellectual and 
professional loggerheads.iii    
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In this context, the French Mission du Centenaire did not simply oversee a busy and 
generally successful commemoration; it also proved remarkably effective in bringing and in 
keeping around the same table a number of historians who often were not on speaking - let 
alone collegial - terms before 2014. This article will not attempt a sociology of this 
controversy. Suffice it to say that, as it is often the case in intellectual milieux, this debate 
revealed a toxic combination of political differences, institutional rivalries, professional 
ambitions and personal enmities. However, the resources and opportunities that the 
centenary offered - along with the increased workload it entailed - underlined the pragmatic 
necessity of cooperation and helped lower the polemical tone of a still simmering 
controversy. For the First World War remains a searing scar in the French historical 
consciousness and an important point of reference in cultural and political debates. This, 
more than the attention devoted to the most recent commemorations, explains why the 
dispute regularly escapes seminar rooms to resurface on the pages of newspapers and 
magazines.iv  
This controversy raises a number of issues of great importance for historians of the French 
and European experiences of the war, but has been artificially maintained to impose a binary 
and profoundly misleading vision of the French historiography of the war. This article will first 
address the controversy in its own terms, considering in turn the “war culture” and the 
responses it generated. It will then discuss two of the key issues raised by the dispute: the 
nature and significance of patriotism in WWI France and the role of the state in social 
mobilisation.  
2. The War Culture: a Paradigm? 
2.1 From cultural history to “war culture” 
The introduction of the concept of “war culture” was one of many manifestations of the  
comparative and cultural turns that have renewed our understanding of the First World War 
since the 1990s.v This ‘new cultural history’ was first defined and practiced by an 
international group of scholars associated with the Historial de la Grande Guerre, a 
transnational museum of the war created at Péronne on the battlefield of the Somme. This 
intellectual and curatorial project was not solely devoted to cultural history but had also been 
designed to challenge conventional national narratives, both popular and scholarly. Its key 
premise was that belligerent societies developed a specific system of representations in 
response to their common experience of industrial warfare and that national identities 
inflected but did not fully determine the cultural dynamics of social mobilisation across the 
continent.vi As a result, it called for a reconsideration of the relationship between belligerent 
states, their armies and civilian populations. This globalising perspective thus took issue with 
national exceptionalisms. It also strove to encompass front and home front in an integrated 
approach, where popular memory and conventional histories of the war had usually 
reinforced the perceived gap between the military and civilian experience of the conflict.vii  
In France, this “new cultural history” was soon associated with Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau 
and Annette Becker who developed a coherent programme of research focussing on the 
“war culture” of 1914-1918 to understand the “investment of the European populations in the 
conflict.”viii Published in 2000, their essay - 14-18 Retrouver la guerre - set out to consolidate 
and systematise the interpretation offered by the cultural history of the war around three key 
ideas: consent, eschatology, and violence. A scholarly argument, their book was also meant 
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to push back against the grain of collective memory which often reduced the war experience 
to victimisation. The archival record, they argued, does not simply document the undeniable 
horrors of industrial warfare; it also testifies to the popular consent to the war.ix This 
“defensive acquiescence” to the war was rooted into a political and emotional attachment to 
the nation, often expressed through the language and images of the sacred. Becker’s work 
on wartime spirituality here reinforced Audoin-Rouzeau’s initial study of national sentiment.x 
They went on to stress the syncretic convergences of religious creeds and secular ideologies 
and to place an “immense collective tension of an eschatological kind” at the heart of the 
“war culture”.xi Finally, their reading of Georges L. Mosse and his concept of “brutalization” 
provided the keystone of their interpretative framework.xii It ascribed a critical centrality to the 
violence of the conflict as a critical determinant of the “war culture”, now defined as the “true 
matrix” of the conflict. The cultural dynamics of the First World War therefore made it the 
harbinger of the industrialised massacres of the Second.xiii  
2.2 From concept to paradigm 
Within a decade, Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker had amply demonstrated the value of cultural 
approaches to the First World War.xiv But the “war culture” did not simply stand for a 
programme of study that they would lead and carry out along with their respective students. 
The particular intellectual context in which it emerged explained why their cultural exploration 
of the First World War came to be seen as a fully-fledged historiographical paradigm. The 
mid-1990s represent a particular juncture in the development of the historical discipline in 
France. Initiated long before the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, the gradual 
abandonment of Marxism as a central point of reference accompanied the decline of the type 
of social and economic history associated with the second generation of the Annales school 
which had dominated French historiography since the 1960s. The bicentenary of the French 
Revolution had for instance been marked by the debates and controversies over François 
Furet’s revisionist arguments. In the following years, French historians would produce a vast 
literature devoted to the analysis of what some perceived as a damaging fragmentation if not 
a full blown crisis of the historical discipline.xv Representatives of different fields and sub-
disciplines were thus encouraged - often by entrepreneurial publishers - to offer their own 
paradigm as a path towards the reconstruction of the discipline as a whole. Indeed the first 
systematic elaboration of the “war culture” argument appeared in a volume championing 
cultural historyxvi. In this context 14-18 Retrouver la Guerre reads as much as a 
historiographical manifesto as a synthesis of the work of historians affiliated with the Historial 
de la Grande Guerre. To be sure Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker successfully defined the 
agenda for First World War studies in France in the last twenty years. The volume and 
quality of the scholarship it generated is no little vindication of an approach which also 
benefitted from their institutional recognition beyond academia.xvii Indeed, the “war culture” 
did find its way into school textbooks and has now been fully absorbed by the curriculum 
prescribed to secondary schools by the French Ministry of Education. More than a simple 
academic concept, “war culture” therefore revealed, if not a paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s 
sense of the word, at least a clear paradigmatic ambition. 
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3. CRID 14-18 and the institutional challenge to the “war 
culture” 
3.1 Popular testimonies and “culture de paix” 
This ambition did not go unchallenged and the intellectual and institutional response to the 
“war culture” soon turned a legitimate debate over its nature and significance into a fierce 
controversy. It publicly erupted at a conference organised in 1998 to take stock of eighty 
years of historical writings on the First World War.xviii At that time, the key point of contention 
was the treatment and status of soldiers’ memoirs and testimonies and the discussion 
specifically focussed on testimonies emphasising victimisation over consent, like that of 
Louis Barthas (1879-1952).xix It then moved on to the interwar critique and anthology of war 
books and literature by Jean Norton Cru (1879-1949).xx Rémy Cazals and Frédéric 
Rousseau, soon joined by Nicolas Offenstadt, organised their response to Audoin-Rouzeau 
and Becker with the creation of the Collectif de Recherche International et de Débat sur la 
Guerre de 1914-1918 (CRID 14-18) in 2005. This group of academic and amateur historians 
set out to formulate an alternative interpretation of the conflict. They denounced and derided 
the “war culture” as a “peronnist (sic)” vision whose dominance in their view stifled academic 
debate. They argued that the “war culture”, predicated upon the testimonies of social and 
cultural elites, unacceptably rode roughshod over the experiences of the common soldiers 
and the memory of their unwilling sacrifice. By contrast to Audoin-Rouzeau’s and Becker’s 
emphasis on “consent”, they argued that the coercive and ideological state apparatus, its 
capacity to suppress dissent and to maintain the discipline within both army and society, 
accounts for the resilience of belligerent societies. The latter, they contend, should never be 
confused or equated with a positive commitment to the war. In their conscious effort to 
mobilise conceptual tools drawn from French radical sociology, they define the cultural 
history of the war as that of the resistance of alienated combatants. Logically, they highlight 
the expression of dissent in the face of state-directed propaganda and oppose “war culture” 
and “culture de paix.” Their argument contributed to but never accurately reflected the wider 
critical discussion of the “war culture” that this article will address below. In France however, 
the strategy pursued by the CRID 14-18 ended up framing the discussion in profoundly 
misleading and problematic ways.  
3.2 A rival paradigmatic ambition 
In many ways, the ambitions of the CRID 14-18 mirror those of the Historial. Both consider it 
a duty to challenge what they perceived to be dominant narratives in the academic and 
public spheres. Though keen to denounce the confusion of history and memory and their 
political usages, the CRID 14-18 chose to establish their group and to hold their meeting at 
Craonne, an iconic site in the pacifist memory of the war. In doing so, they appropriated a 
site which might be construed as the “anti-Verdun” to reject consensual and patriotic 
narratives. Such an association of their historiographical project with a symbol of wartime 
dissent reinforced their public strategy as well as their focus on the French experience and 
memory of the war. By contrast to most academic networks or societies, the CRID 14-18 
defines itself, in the parlance of contemporary social movements, as a collective. They 
conceive First World War studies as a “field” in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms; a domain wherein 
actors mobilise their resources and capital to stake their claim to dominance in a field here 
mainly defined in national terms. Indeed, despite their stated international remit, the CRID 
14-18 primarily invested First World War studies in France and never fully engaged in 
transnational debates. Its leaders set out to mobilise their networks in the media and 
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publishing worlds to give the larger echo possible to their intellectual enterprise. The fact that 
this controversy regularly found its way onto the pages of leading newspapers and 
magazines demonstrates the protagonists successfully mobilised the social capital afforded 
them by their eminent professional and social status. For the controversy is not simply a 
procedure used to adjudicate between scholarly interpretations. It is a strategy to impose 
one’s domination in a particular field. This was notably illustrated in 2008 and 2009 after the 
publication of series of review articles in the left-leaning, online cultural magazine, La Vie des 
Idées. They included an attempt by an independent scholar, Jean-Yves Le Naour, to suggest 
ways to move beyond the controversy. This earned him a rather virulent and revealing attack 
from four leading members of the CRID 14-18.xxi Their response was remarkable for a 
number of reasons. It was first aimed at a historian who, despite its significant contribution to 
the field, operated outside the academy and who therefore did not present an institutional 
threat.xxii The media presence of Le Naour, a prolific historian and former student of Audoin-
Rouzeau’s, might well have got under the skin of ambitious academics crying out for similar 
recognition. Be that as it may, the tone as much as the substance of the criticism levelled at 
Le Naour did betray the properly existential nature of the controversy which provided the 
CRID with its raison d’être and accounts for its organising principles. Membership of the 
CRID 14-18 is indeed limited to those whose application has been seconded by existing 
members. Each application is then vetted by the group’s advisory board who must 
unanimously agree to the fitness of the would-be member. Such procedure stands in sharp 
contrast to the collective’s professed commitment to open debate and to their very public 
protestations against the political uses and abuses of history. 
3.3 Social history vs cultural history 
Whatever reservations one may express at the methods and strategy the CRID 14-18 
deployed to prevail in the “field”, it did produce a considerable and useful body of work. 
Unfortunately, the CRID’s insistence on framing the historical discussion in polarising terms 
undermined its reception and diminished its overall contribution. For instance, Rousseau’s La 
guerre censurée undercut his own comparative ambition by placing the experience of 
European combatants in the analytical straightjacket of the French debate. As he strains to 
elevate coercion, propaganda, and the state suppression of dissent to the central and 
ultimate determinant of the war experience, it artificially homogenises its undeniable plurality. 
It also radically underestimates the agency of subaltern soldiers and civilians. Most 
problematically, the years leading to the centenary saw the CRID 14-18 turn their critique of 
the “war culture” paradigm into a wholesale repudiation of cultural history itself. This recent 
development is no little paradox when one considers the contribution made by André Loez or 
Nicolas Offenstadt to the cultural history of the war. Such is however the logical endpoint of a 
controversy which hinged on the relentless pursuit of a historiographical straw man. Its 
construction did not simply entail a reductio ad absurdum of Audoin-Rouzeau’s and Becker’s 
paradigmatic ambitions. It also requires the assimilation of all types of cultural history to their 
interpretative framework. This systematic critique of the “war culture” eventually turned into a 
radical rejection of cultural history. While the CRID’s interventions now routinely dismiss 
“culturalist” interpretationsxxiii, its denunciation of cultural history was most forcefully 
articulated in 2014 by Philippe Olivera. Olivera characterises the “new history” of the Great 
War as an elitist and eminently political project pursued by powerful intellectuals anxious to 
negate the historical reality and contemporary potential of class distinctions and social 
conflicts.xxiv In vehement and often condescending terms, Olivera effectively accuse other 
historians of evading a necessary debate over the “war culture”, of compounding intellectual 
failure with political cowardice. Regardless of the political implications of his charge, Olivera 
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inexplicably gives short shrift to the methodology of cultural history and to its French 
practitioners. Roger Chartier, to name but one, demonstrated long before the dispute erupted 
that there was no contradiction between the history of representations and that of social 
identities and class relations.xxv And pace Olivera, historians of the First World War did not 
wait for the centenary commemorations to mobilise the very references he invokes - from 
Gramsci to Bourdieu - to explore the interaction of consent and coercion as well as the role 
of social conflict in wartime mobilisation.xxvi In the end, this attempt to fan the flames of the 
controversy achieved little but to promote a distorted and partial view of French 
historiography in general and of the debate over the “war culture” in particular. 
4. War and belligerence 
In fact, the controversy never gave a comprehensive and accurate picture of the healthy and 
vigorous discussions that the “war culture” prompted within and outside France. This debate 
is testament to the importance of the contribution that cultural history made to First World 
War studies and raised key issues of importance for historians of the French and European 
experiences of the conflict. Scholars first took exception with the primacy that Audoin-
Rouzeau and Becker ascribed to the “war culture” as the normative matrix of the conflict.xxvii 
Military historians also reminded us that culture can hardly be described as the ultimate 
determinant of the war experience when tactical and operational constraints, as well as 
technology or logistics, also defined the character of the conflict.xxviii If the violence of the First 
World War reached unprecedented thresholds and challenged the conventional 
demarcations between combatants and non-combatants, many historians have expressed 
doubt about George Mosse’s brutalization thesis too. Mosse’s analysis of the German 
experience of the conflict raised fascinating questions about the continuation of war and the 
process of cultural demobilisation in Europe. It thus opened up a now vibrant field of 
inquiry.xxix It does not however account for the different ways in which the war altered the 
political and cultural foundations of belligerent societies or affected veterans’ personalities.xxx 
Jay Winter recently suggested that WWI testified less of a brutalization conceived in Mosse’s 
terms than in the degeneration of the norms of warfare, particularly after 1917.xxxi 
4.1 Consent and belligerence 
The scale and complexity of the national, let alone European or global, experiences of an 
industrial conflict such as the Great War is enough to dampen any grand generalising 
ambition that scholars might entertain. Yet Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker identified key 
aspects of the cultural dynamics which underpinned the social and military mobilisation for 
war in Europe. Across many belligerent countries, and irrespective of their actual strategic 
positions, the conflict was perceived as a defensive war, waged against an uncivilised and 
often dehumanised enemy, whose victory threatened one’s own culture, identity, and way of 
life. That this narrative formed a central part of state-directed propaganda does not mean 
that the populations were hoodwinked into the conflict by nationalist lies and maintained in a 
state of mental subjugation by propaganda and censorship. In this regard, one can hardly 
overstate the significance of the invasions of 1914. In France, the initial success of the 
mobilisation and the continuing resilience of soldiers and civilians was construed as a 
response to an illegitimate and brutal aggression. By contrast to 1940, the imperative of 
national defence was never seriously questioned. Consent, however, was not synonymous 
with enthusiasm for war as Jean-Jacques Becker demonstrated in the late 1970s.xxxii The 
need for an operative definition of consent is indeed an area of agreement among French 
scholars of the Great War.xxxiii Sociologist and CRID member Nicolas Mariot thus drew on the 
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work of J. D. Wright and M. Dobry, to suggest an interesting typology of wartime attitudes 
and elaborates on the notions of ‘consent’, ‘dissent’, and ‘assent’.xxxiv Wright’s ‘assent’ does 
however imply a depth of sociological alienation that only ever affected the most marginal 
sections of the belligerent societies.xxxv The “totalizing logic” (John Horne) of the war and the 
compound impact of human losses and economic dislocation meant that the conflict 
pervaded virtually all spheres of social and individual life. Yet Mariot’s case for a critical and 
sociological approach to consent is eminently sensible as the invocation of a singular “war 
culture” misrepresents the nature of social mobilisation. The core narrative identified by 
Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker was indeed constantly reconfigured through a process of 
acculturation and appropriation that committed most social groups to the war effort. The 
plurality of the war cultures sustaining their mobilisation was indeed rooted in concomitant 
senses of belonging (national, class, religious, gender, local identies, etc.) and in their 
respective social history. While consent tends to understate this plurality, the notion of 
belligerence underlines by contrast the social construction of wartime mobilisation, 
acknowledges the unequal power relations that defined social interactions, and underscores 
the conditionality of consent. Belligerence was indeed constantly reconfigured in the course 
of this industrial conflict and refers to the process of negotiation that accounts for individual 
and collective commitment to the war effort or its rejection.xxxvi 
4.2 Mutinies and negotiations 
The debate over the mutinies which affected the French army in 1917 further underlines the 
limitations and pitfalls of the alternative consent/coercion imposed by the controversy. The 
most illuminating study of these mutinies, arguably the most severe crisis faced by France 
during the conflict, was published in 1994 by an American historian, Leonard V. Smith. His 
book, Between Mutiny and Obedience, is an investigation into the experience of the 5th 
Infantry Division, a unit celebrated for its performance in the field but whose soldiers also 
played a major role in the 1917 mutinies.xxxvii Based on a thorough engagement with both 
military history and social theories, Smith mobilizes the work of Michel Foucault in particular 
to make sense of the acts of collective indiscipline which threatened to undermine the French 
war effort. Informed by a Foucauldian approach to “the recalcitrance of the will and the 
intransigence of freedom”, Smith carefully examined the exercise of command authority and 
explored the conditionality of consent. Highlighting the importance of the political identity of 
the French “citizen soldiers”, he ultimately demonstrated that the legitimising principles, 
which underpinned the political communities that fought each other in the trenches of the 
First World War, were at stake in combat. He places the experience of the division in its 
larger political and social context. In contrast to conventional historiography, he insisted on 
the political nature of the mutiny, arguing that the internalisation of the principles of popular 
and national sovereignty – essential tenets of French republican culture – accounted for both 
the mutinies and the return of these citizen-soldiers to the line of duty. His work is therefore 
equally concerned with consent and coercion, as he places a constant process of contested 
negotiation at the heart of frontline politics. Smith’s argument never neatly fitted the terms of 
the controversy. This is perhaps why it has unfortunately been more often cited than 
genuinely discussed by French historians.  
Recent research however has drawn more extensively on Smith’s work. André Loez, a CRID 
stalwart produced a very impressive monograph on the French mutiny in which he discussed 
Smith’s at lengthxxxviii. Significantly however, his reluctance to move out of the parameters 
defined by the controversy in which he played a leading role, dramatically undermined his 
potential analytical contribution. Loez offers a comprehensive list and map of every recorded 
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incident of collective indiscipline. In this respect, he undeniably enriched our understanding 
of the mutinies and of indiscipline throughout the conflict. He also offers a very interesting 
sociology of mutineers and sets out to analyse the logic of collective action of mutineers. 
Where Smith argues that the mutinies were directly aimed at the way the way the war was 
being fought, Loez insists that they indicated an outright rejection of the war. Where the 
historiography conventionally insists on the High Command’s – and Philippe Pétain’s (1856-
1951) – relative leniency towards the mutineers, he reasserts the critical importance of the 
suppression of dissent. Coercion, Loez contends by opposition to Smith, brought the 
mutineers back to the front line. Loez rightly insists on the difficulty to bring about and lead a 
social movement under the conditions of industrial warfare. Echoing in some way, Mariot’s 
“alienation”, he also insists on what he calls “the inertia of war”. For Loez, the war happened 
in 1914 to French soldiers unable to do anything about it or to conceive any alternative. His 
analysis flounders at this point. The war did indeed happen to French soldiers and civilians 
who, by and large, did not want or call for it. The invasion of 1914, so brilliantly analysed by 
John Horne and Alan Kramer, did however convince the majority of soldiers and civilians that 
this war was a war worth fighting for. The alternative - German occupation and domination - 
was seen as simply unacceptable across the political and social spectrum. This is what 
accounts for the success of military mobilisation in 1914. One did not have to embrace the 
war to be committed to its victorious end. The absence of a speedy conclusion to military 
operations did not fundamentally alter this strategic imperative. Up until 1918, the military 
map always showed the presence of German armies deep into French territory. Invoking, as 
Loez, the “inertia of war” does not merely and rather awkwardly sidestep this basic fact; it 
also belies the strategic intelligence and agency of French soldiers and civilians. One did not 
need an exceptional degree of education to understand that the enemy was camping deep 
into the national territory; that, should the lines of defence be breached, one’s home, village, 
town, family and friends would be directly under threat. Smith’s work underlined that 
mutineers never ceased to care for the safety of their own. This commitment to national 
defence did not equate with nationalism. The terms of the controversy have indeed obscured 
that the very mundanity of national sentiment and loyalty was key to the resilience of wartime 
France. 
5. Patriotism and the French state at war 
5.1 The nature of patriotic mobilisation 
The logic and dynamic of the historiographical dispute have encouraged and reinforced the 
radical formulations of each side’s argument at the expense of their respective nuancesxxxix. 
This was particularly to the detriment of a necessary debate over wartime patriotism. 
Paradoxically perhaps, one could argue that both schools of interpretation share a 
“consensualist” view of social mobilisation: the idea that wartime mobilisation stemmed from 
the “Union Sacrée” and from a rather improbable national consensus; an idea that remains 
surprisingly prevalent across the divide. For Audoin-Rouzeau, A. Becker and many others, 
national mobilisation was the effect and product of a patriotic consensus crystallised by war 
violence into a specific ‘war culture’. For R. Cazals, F. Rousseau, N. Offenstadt, and A. Loez, 
strikes and mutinies demonstrate that national mobilisation was only made possible and 
maintained by the exercise of state coercion and propaganda. Though they draw opposite 
conclusions from the French war experience, both interpretations therefore seem to share 
the same premise; namely that only national consensus could underpin wartime national 
mobilisation. They also – surprisingly and unwittingly perhaps – collude in neglecting 
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patriotism as a category of political analysis.xl On the one hand, proponents of the “war 
culture” paradigm stress the symbolic and emotional dimensions of “national sentiment”. 
Drawing on anthropology, literary scholarship, and art history, they rarely mobilize the 
categories of political history, which had been central to the works of an earlier generation 
represented by Jean-Jacques Becker and Antoine Prost. On the other side of the argument, 
their opponents seem reluctant to give much credence to patriotism, lest it undermine their 
overall paradigm. In any case, they appear unwilling or unable to reconcile the existence of 
social or regional tensions with the possibility of commitment to national defence.xli  
Surprisingly, French historians of the war have thus far rarely and seriously engaged with 
historical and social scientific approaches to nationalism and nationhood.xlii Nicolas Mariot’s 
study of the frontline encounters between intellectuals and working-class soldiers is a 
welcome exception. Anxious to challenge the notion that the war experience brought classes 
and social group together, Mariot relies on the testimonies of combatant intellectuals to argue 
that the resilience of soldiers cannot be taken as evidence of patriotism, which he reduces to 
the idealistic system embraced by intellectuals and nationalist alike.xliii Yet their rhetoric 
belied the nature of patriotism. Expressed in the most mundane words and habits, patriotism 
was a sense of belonging and loyalty that ought not to be confused with nationalism and the 
systematic primacy of the Nation-state. Patriotism was and should be understood in both an 
anthropological and legal-political sense, as a performance of solidarity to kith and kin as well 
as a performance of loyalty to an imagined community of fellow citizens. Nationalism – both 
as a political project and as category of analysis – is intimately bound up with the demands 
that the state may place on the citizenry. By contrast, patriotism underline the capacity to 
mobilize nationhood to assert distance towards the state and even to resist its authority in 
contradiction with the prescriptions of nationalist ideologies. Here Smith’s analysis of frontline 
politics chimes in with recent social and in particular urban histories of the war. As the 
demands of industrial warfare defined the “social relations of sacrifice” in specific ways, 
patriotism was effectively invoked and mobilised against the policies of the wartime state. 
The language of patriotism cannot be dismissed as a mere expression of social conformity in 
a time of censorship and propaganda as Frédéric Rousseau argues in his latest book.xliv It 
would not simply overstate the efficiency of the state’s police apparatus; it would effectively 
suppress the voices of subaltern participants in the conflict.  
The success of wartime mobilisation did not rest on an improbable national consensus, but 
on the willingness and capacity of patriots of all hues to reconcile their diverging 
understandings of the national project to defend the existence of the national community. In a 
context defined by the invasion and occupation of the national territory, social movements, 
including strikes and mutinies, allowed social groups to assert the condition of their 
participation in the war effort. Conscription alone was not sufficient to convince the French 
that military service would be equally shared within a citizenry already unevenly affected by 
shortages and inflation.xlv The constant recriminations prompted by perceived or real 
instances of shirking and profiteering, along with strikes over working and pay conditions, 
demonstrated that the state never successfully claimed a monopoly over the definition of 
patriotism. Indeed, it was in the name of patriotism that its authority and policies were 
challenged, albeit within the obvious constraints imposed by wartime legislation.xlvi 
5.2 French politics, civil society, and the Republic at war 
The first two years of the conflict saw France suffer half of its total war-related deaths. As 
John Horne recently pointed out, “France in 1914-1915 was a society in shock.”xlvii In a 
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context defined by unprecedented mass casualties and economic dislocations, where the 
gap between pre-war expectations and the reality of industrial warfare was underlined daily 
by the staggering level of human and social sacrifice it required, the overall consent to the 
war would of course be challenged at an individual and collective levels. Critically however 
the strategic stalemate meant that the foundational case for a war of national defence 
remained unquestionable. But wartime mobilisation was not simply the result of a resolute or 
resigned state of mind. It was a contested process where state authorities and civil society 
organisations (from churches to charities through political parties) redirected their resources 
towards the overarching goal of national defence. The intensity of mobilisation undeniably 
varied in time and space and in response to the uneven social pressures of war. Stuck in the 
crude alternative between consent and coercion, the French debate never fully integrated 
Horne’s critical insights in the different phases and mechanisms of social mobilisation: self-
mobilisation, remobilisation, and demobilisation.xlviii His remarkable body of work, ranging 
from labour to cultural history, illuminates key aspects of the  French social, political, and 
colonial experiences of war and demonstrates the inanity of pre-conceived methodological 
demarcations. It also underscores and nuances the central role played by the state.   
The history of wartime politics is that of the indisputable expansion of the state apparatus 
and, therefore, of the exercise of state-enforced coercion. Yet the aptly-described 
“exuberance” of the French state belies the nature of its wartime relationship with other 
economic and social agents.xlix For the war did emphasise the limitations of the state as 
much as it stressed its undeniable capacity to steer the economic and social resources of the 
country towards the war effort. New forms of cooperation between the state, businesses, 
labour and civil society organisations gave rise to a contingent type of wartime corporatism.l 
This reflected the pragmatic imperatives that lay at the heart of social mobilisation in France 
and across the belligerent world. But its success did not solely depend on the legitimacy of 
the war effort; it hinged on the legitimacy of the state itself. The state’s response to the 
tensions born out of the war was therefore critically important. Of course, the geo-strategic 
position of the Triple Entente allowed France to meet the key material demands arising out of 
social movements.li But its Republican regime and liberal political culture also provided a 
framework which proved flexible enough to manage the socio-economic strains and outright 
conflicts arising out of wartime mobilisation.lii  
The conflict had suspended the electoral process and censorship, progaganda, as well as 
conscription and material hardship further curtailed the operations of the liberal public 
sphere. Wartime politics however was not wholly subsumed or suppressed by the operations 
of the coercive state apparatus. This is one of the key conclusions of those historians whose 
work could not be reduced to the terms of the “war culture” controversy.liii Local, urban, and 
institutional perspectives do indeed reveal how the conflict reinforced the terms of the social 
contract to which citizenship refers. They also underline the importance of institutionalised as 
well as informal processes of negotiation and bargaining.liv As a result, social conflicts cannot 
simply be understood as evidence of the unravelling of social mobilisation. It was indeed a 
more dynamic process in which social conflicts allowed social groups to claim and extract 
economic compensations or policy changes. Mutinies and strikes partook of the same 
process in this regard. The state’s reluctant willingness to accommodate such claims 
stemmed from its dependence on civil society. Despite its dominance, the state alone could 
not extract the resources for industrial warfare. When their policies were contested at home 
and on the frontlines in the language of rights and equality of sacrifice, the leaders of the 
Third Republic could not and did not rely on coercion alone. The republican political culture 
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did not simply colour wartime social movements. It buttressed their claims and compelled the 
state to accommodate them. Neither consent nor coercion alone fully account for the social 
or political history of WWI France. 
6. Conclusion 
The controversy over the 1914-1918 “war culture” was shaped, in no small part, by the 
politics of French intellectual and academic life in the 1990s. To be sure, the centenary 
commemorations did not quite bring it to an end. However the most recent efforts to revive it 
appears likely to fail even if the scholarly issues it raised remain of critical importance. The 
alternative between consent and coercion has indeed long ceased to reflect the nature of the 
historiographical debate which now rightly focuses on a continuum of attitudes ranging from 
acceptance and endurance to refusal.lv The artificial and strict demarcations between cultural 
and social history also do not do justice to the very best studies of the French experience of 
the conflictlvi.   
Comparative history too has offered a welcome corrective to this polarised debatelvii. Yet the 
controversy arguably reinforced the solipsistic tendencies of national history in France and 
certainly hampered a systematic engagement with foreign historiographies. Transnational 
studies of the Great War remain few and far between in France and it is fair to say that the 
global history of the conflict remains a minority concern there.lviii The persistence of the 
controversy also highlights other gaps in the French historiography of the conflict. 
Operational histories as well as studies of strategy, command, and generalship remain 
relatively scarce.lix The economic history of the war is also rather neglected at the expense of 
a wider reflection on the political economy of this global conflict.lx Likewise, in spite of the 
pioneering works of Michelle Perrot and Fabienne Thébaud or the outstanding contribution of 
Susan Grayzel, the controversy never fully engaged and built on the studies of gender 
relations and sexual identities which did so much to renew our understanding of the war.lxi 
A truly European history of the conflict remains a daunting and distant goal but French 
scholarship would certainly benefit from greater engagement with foreign historiographies 
and transnational frameworks of analysis. The impact of French historians on the 
international scholarly debate is, after all, clear. Interestingly however, international 
scholarship on the conflict rarely adopted the terms of the French debate on “war culture”. In 
this regard, the British historiography of the First World War offers an interesting 
counterpoint. Another liberal democratic regime, Britain entered the war as the French 
army’s junior partner on land. This was, in no small part, due to the strategic choices made to 
protect British colonial possessions and the maritime trade routes upon which depended the 
economy of the British isles. Britain’s land forces were never intended to match the might of 
the Royal Navy. In 1914, Britain also relied on voluntary recruitment and on a localized 
regimental system whereas France mobilized a national conscript army.lxii In other words, 
these parent liberal democracies had adopted two very different systems of recruitment and 
military organization. These stemmed of course from distinct political trajectories and 
strategic challenges since the late eighteenth century. In Britain however, both the scholarly 
and public debates have also long been concerned with discipline and the wartime growth of 
a coercive state apparatus, even though these were rarely pitted against the population’s 
overall consent to the war.lxiii More recently, scholars illuminated the complex socio-economic 
and cultural dynamics which underpinned the mobilization of British society for war and 
volunteerism in particular.lxiv Like in France, and indeed other countries such as Italy, a public 
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controversy over military discipline marked the 1990s and underlined the problematic 
articulation of historical scholarship and collective memory. In some quarters, this debate 
was framed as an opposition between military history and cultural memory; the occasionally 
willful confusion between history and memory serving as a gossamer screen between 
nationalist and pacifist readings of the war experience.lxv However vehement at times, the 
British historiographical discussion never suffered from the type of polarization that affected 
debates across the Channel. A thorough comparative discussion falls beyond the remit of 
this paper, but a number of factors certainly account for this: the centrality of the languages 
of class in contemporary Britain, the strength and sophistication of British operational history, 
the influence of E. P. Thomson and the New Left on the practice of social history, the greater 
internationalization of British universities. For all its robustness, the British discussion over 
coercion, consent, and wartime social mobilization never descended into controversy and 
scholars have by and large eschewed facile and misleading oppositions between historical 
genres and methodologies.lxvi 
Considerable work is still to be done to understand the complexity of the French experience 
of this global war. Whatever the controversy over the “war culture” ever achieved, one cannot 
but rejoice that it never fully closed down the academic debate or discouraged the many 
brilliant early-career scholars who continue to plough this fascinating field of studies. 
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